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Charles Sennett is an American monster who murdered his wife by contract. Where is Karl now? Let’s find out something about him in this article.
Charles Sennett (senior), the pastor of the Church of Christ, was suspected of murder by police after they discovered he was having an affair, and some believe he was having an affair with a female member of his congregation.
In the late 1980s, a man was stabbed.
The preacher instructed the two assassins to go to his wife’s house and leave her alone, telling them that they could take whatever they wanted from there.
Charles Sennett American Monster Wikipedia
Charles Sennett was not mentioned on the official Wikipedia page, so there is not much information about him.
However, we managed to collect some of his information from various websites that talk about him.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDgP5dUfhPQ
It was his lover who proved him with the money, which he then spent on the assassination.
As it turned out, the preacher had lied to Doris Twell, his mistress.
Assuming it was a burglary, the preacher hoped the police would assume some men had broken into his home and killed his wife because she got in the way of their robbery.
Elizabeth Dorlene Murder: Man Killed His Wife Through Contract Killing
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Assaults on his wife, Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, including stabbing and blowing with a whistle, before she was hanged.
Life insurance for her was worth $1,000 to him, so he pa three men $1,000 each to kill them so he could collect them because he owed money.
The two killers knocked on the door or rang the bell, spoke to the woman at her front door, and she let them in. Then they beat her wife to death.
Although the preacher pa thousands of dollars to two hit men to kill his then 45-year-old wife.
Sennett fooled Twell into believing he needed her $3,000 for a legitimate reason.
Who Is Charles Sennett First Wife?
Charles’ first wife was not mentioned anywhere on the internet.
We managed to find Charles’s wedding date and it shows that it was 1962.
There is also information that Charles had affairs with many other women, and these data have yet to be verified.
Where Is Charles Sennett Now?
Sennett is sa to have committed suice while law enforcement officers were conducting their investigation into the incent.
Currently his date is not available and we only found his late post posted decades ago.
A lot of people are curious as to where he is now, and we’re excited to find out details about him too.
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Learn about Charles Sennett American Monster Wikipedia: First Wife, New Wife Elizabeth Dorlene Murder. Where Is Charles Sennett Now?
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Charles Sennett American Monster Wikipedia: Man Killed His …
Charles Sennett is an American monster who has killed his wife through contract killing. Where is Charles now? Let”s find about him in this …
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Smith v. State :: 1991 :: Alabama Court of Criminal … – Justia Law
The evence at trial indicated that Charles Sennett solicited Billy Gray Williams to kill his wife or to arrange to have his wife killed, in return for …
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Date Published: 3/17/2021
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Alabama man executed in 1988 contract killing
ATMORE (AP) — Alabama death row inmate John Forrest Parker apologized to the family of his victim minutes before he was executed Thursday …
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Smith v. State
588 So. 2d 561 (1991)
Kenneth Eugene SMITH v STATE.
CR-89-1290.
Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals.
September 20, 1991.
*565 David K. Howard and John M. Kennemer, Tuscumbia, for the applicant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette and Sandra J. Stewart, Asst. atty Gen., for Appellants.
McMILLAN, Judge.
The appellant was found guilty of the capital murder of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett in order to obtain money. The applicant’s motion for a change of venue was granted and the case was moved from Colbert County, Alabama to Jefferson County, Alabama for trial. After the jury found guilty, a jury held a hearing that resulted in a consultative death sentence. A separate sentencing hearing was then held before the court of first instance, as a result of which the applicant was sentenced to death.
Records indicate that the victim, Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, was married to Charles Sennett, a Church of Christ minister. Charles Sennett had a history of mental health issues and was having an extramarital affair and financial difficulties at the time of the crime. Evidence at trial suggested that Charles Sennett had asked Billy Gray Williams to kill his wife or arrange for his wife to be killed in return for monetary consideration. Thereafter, Billy Williams approached the applicant regarding the matter. Although it is unclear whether the applicant initially believed that the suggestion was simply to hit and frighten the victim, evidence showed that the applicant knew at least three days before the act that he was expected to kill the victim. The applicant attempted to persuade a third party to participate in the offence; However, the party refused. The complainant then approached John Forrest Parker, who agreed to take part in the crime. Although he did not know the *566 Sennetts’ names, the complainant met with Charles Sennett and Billy Williams prior to the crime.
On the day of the crime, the applicant and John Parker drove to the Sennetts’ home. The victim, Elizabeth Sennett, was home alone. The two men knocked on the door and informed Elizabeth Sennett that her husband had told them they could explore the Sennetts’ property because they wanted to hunt in the countryside. Elizabeth Sennett kept the two men waiting while she called her husband to verify her story. Charles Sennett apparently told his wife to allow them to roam the property. Elizabeth Sennett remained in the house while the two men walked behind the property and, according to the applicant, drove down the road and then returned. The men knocked on the door again and asked Elizabeth Sennett if they could go to the bathroom and get some water. Elizabeth Sennett let her into the house and while John Parker was in the bathroom the complainant spoke to Mrs Sennett. John Parker approached Elizabeth Sennett from behind and “surprised her”. This was followed by a beating, in which the victim apparently fought for her life. The evidence indicated that during the beating, every object within reach was used as a weapon. The men apparently used each piece of a chimney set, a walking stick and a length of galvanized pipe and, after hitting them, stabbed her eight times with a survival knife. Several of these weapons, or parts thereof, including the survival knife, were later found in a pond behind the Sennetts’ residence. Although it is unclear whether both or just one of the men participated in the beating and subsequent stabbing, it is clear that both men were present and involved in the crime.
In the applicant’s statement, he stated that they had been told to make the act look like a burglary ‘gone wrong’ and that the men had therefore taken a VCR and stereo with them. Shortly after the murder, Charles Sennett returned to the house and called the sheriff’s office to report that someone had broken into his home and killed his wife. A week later, when the investigation turned to him, Charles Sennett killed himself. Billy Williams, John Parker and the applicant each received $1,000 from Charles Sennett for their participation in the crime.
The applicant argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his conviction for capital murder. In particular, the appellant submits that the State failed to fulfill its burden of proof as regards the pecuniary advantage element. The applicant conceded in his statement that he was to be paid $1,000 for committing the crime and that he was paid $200 in advance and received the remainder after the crime was committed. However, the applicant argues that there was no independent evidence of this element sufficient to allow this statement into evidence. See Bracewell v. State, 506 So. 2d 354 (Ala. Cr.App.1986).
The State submitted evidence through the testimony of a friend of the applicant, who stated that he had known the applicant since kindergarten and had visited him every day. He testified that he went to the applicant’s home the day after the murder and noticed that the applicant had an unusually large amount of money. He testified that he believed the money was in $20 denominations. He testified that he had never seen the complainant with that much money and that the complainant had told him that the money came from an income tax refund.
Another witness for the State, who testified that he was a close friend of the applicant, stated that prior to the offence, the applicant invited him to participate in the offence. The complainant told him he knew where to make “quick money” because a man needed someone “to hurt his old lady or something”.
“Independent evidence of corpus delicti need not be of such probative value that such evidence, standing alone, would, in the opinion of the trial or appellate court, ought to, or likely would, satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of *567 the existence of the corpus delicti.” ” C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 304.01 (4th ed. 1991). Circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence can provide this independent evidence. Henderson v. State, 584 So. 2d 841 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).
“The corpus delicti is a fact which may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and if there is a reasonable conclusion proving its existence, the court should present to the jury the question of the sufficiency and weight of the evidence tending to support that conclusion .’ Hines [v. State, 260 Ala. 668, 671, 72 So. 2d 296, 298 (1954)] “’Positive, direct proof of the corpus delicti is not essential for admitting confessions. Whenever facts and circumstances are established which would enable a jury to legally conclude that the offense was committed, the confessions are admissible.” Snead [v. State, 251 Ala. 624, 627, 38 So. 2d 576, 579 (1948) ] (quoting Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 94, 95, 14 So. 868 (1894)).
“It is an established rule that a confession is not admissible until the corpus delicti is first proved. However, if facts are shown from which the jury can reasonably conclude that the crime was committed, all other evidence tending to imply that the accused was thereby rendered admissible.
“That’s for sure
“`”Inconclusive facts and circumstances, which at first sight tend to show the corpus delicti, may be supported by the confessions or confessions of defendants to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and thus support a conviction , although such facts and circumstances stand alone would not convince the jury of the existence of the corpus delicti.” Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 South. 460; Matthews vs. State, 55 Ala. 187; Ryan vs State, 100 ala. 94, 14 South. 868; 16 Corpus Juris, § 1514, p. 737.”
“Arthur v. State, 19 Ala. apartment 311, 312, 97 So. 158, 159 (1923). See also Ratliff v. State, 212 Ala. 410, 412, 102 So. 621, 623 (1924).”
Howell v. State, 571 So. 2d 396, 397 (Ala.Cr. App.1990).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the victim was brutally beaten and stabbed. Furthermore, the complainant’s involvement is undisputed, although the complainant has contested the extent of his involvement. The State has presented ample evidence to link the applicant to the crime and to show that the victim was killed deliberately in a contract killing. See Henderson v. State, above. We therefore find that the State’s evidence was sufficient to support the applicant’s conviction and to admit the applicant’s confession as evidence.
II
The applicant argues that the trial court jury’s instructions on reasonable doubt violated the due process clause of the Constitution. The applicant quotes Cage v. Louisiana, ___ US ___, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed. 2d 339 (1990), in support of his argument. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an order of reasonable doubt improperly suggested a higher level of doubt than would be required for an acquittal under the doubt standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970). The instructions given in Cage said in the relevant part:
“If you have a reasonable doubt as to any facts or elements necessary to establish the accused’s guilt, it is your duty to support that doubt and grant an acquittal. Even if the evidence shows probable guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. However, this doubt must be reasonable, that is, one based on a really tangible material basis and not on mere whims and conjectures. It must be of such doubt that it would give rise to a serious uncertainty, in your opinion, as a result of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence or the absence of such evidence. A reasonable doubt is not merely a possible doubt, but an actual *568 substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable person can seriously entertain. What is required is not absolute or mathematical certainty, but moral certainty.’ State of Cage, 554 So. 2d 39, 41 (La.1989).”
___ USA at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 329. (Cage’s emphasis.) Noting that this instruction was inconsistent with In re Winship, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated:
“In interpreting the order, we consider how reasonable jurors could have understood the indictment as a whole.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972, 85 L.Ed. 2d 344 (1985) At one point the prosecution directed that for a conviction to be found guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but then they equated a reasonable doubt with a “serious uncertainty” and a “actually substantial doubt” and stated that what was required was a “moral certainty” that the accused was guilty. We realize that the words “substantial” and “serious” as commonly understood suggest a greater degree of doubt than one might have When these statements are then tested on the basis of “moral certainty” rather than probative certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable jury could interpret the order to establish guilt on the basis of a degree of evidence can be ascertained which is below the level required by the due process clause.”
Cage vs. Louisiana, ___ USA at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 329-30.
In the present case, the district court essentially instructed the jury as follows:
“The term ‘reasonable doubt’ is self-explanatory, and efforts to define it do not always clarify the term. But it may help you if you say that the doubt that would justify an acquittal must be an actual and substantial doubt, and not just a possible doubt… A reasonable doubt is not a mere supposition or conjecture, and it poses nor does it constitute an enforced or arbitrary doubt. If, after examining all the evidence in this case, you are firmly satisfied that the allegations are true, then you are satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt and it would be your duty to convict the accused. The reasonable doubt qualifying a defendant for an acquittal is not a mere fanciful, vague, conjectural or speculative doubt, but a reasonable substantial doubt arising from the evidence and after careful examination of the testimony as reasonable, faire and would entertain conscientious men and women under all circumstances. Well, you will find that the State need not convince you that the accused’s guilt is beyond a doubt, but simply beyond a reasonable doubt and a moral certainty. If, after comparing and considering all the evidence in this case, you remain in such a condition that you cannot say that you have an abiding belief of any moral certainty of the accused’s guilt, then you are not beyond a reasonable doubt convinced, and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal.”
(Emphasis added.)
The question of exactly what language a juror’s direction might prompt a juror to believe that a lesser degree of evidence was required was further clarified by the United States Supreme Court in a memorandum decision stating that Court certiorari refused. Gaskins v. McKellar, ___ USA ___, 111 S. Ct. 2277, 114 L.Ed. 2d 728 (1991). In that Memorandum Opinion, Judge Stevens wrote:
“One of the questions raised in the Certiori petition is whether our per curiam decision in Cage v. However, this question would only be asked by the log if the instructions in this case contained the same error as the instructions in cage. In Cage, the jury was instructed that a reasonable doubt “must be a doubt which would give rise to a great uncertainty….” Ibid. at ___ [111 S.Ct. at 329] Since the instructions to the jury in this case did not contain the inappropriate language, the question *569 as to whether Cage announced a new rule is not actually submitted here. For this reason, I think the Court was right in deciding not to issue certiorari to examine this question.”
ID.
Similarly, in the present case, the phrase “severe uncertainty” used in Cage v. Louisiana, see above, not available. Furthermore, “[t]his court has previously ruled that the mere use of terminology that also happens to appear in Cage does not necessarily constitute a reversible error. See Williams v. State, [Ms. 89-191, 14 June 1991], 1991 WL 119358 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991); Adams v. State, 587 So. 2d 1265 (Ala.Cr.App.1991).” Earhart v. State, [Ms. 90-72, August 23, 1991], 1991 WL 184480 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). Therefore, the trial court’s instructions to the jury regarding the standard of reasonable doubt in the present case were correct.
III
The applicant argues that, during his closing arguments at the guilt and conviction stages of the applicant’s trial, the prosecutor made a number of improper remarks which violated his rights to due process, a fair trial and a reliable sentencing. The applicant refers to seven remarks made by the prosecutor during his closing arguments in the guilt phase which the applicant considered inappropriate. None of these comments were objected to, so they only constitute a reversible error if they constitute a simple error under rule 45A, A.R.App.P.
The applicant alleges that in their first statements to the jury, the prosecutor and the assistant prosecutor emphasized their role as representatives of the state. The notes show that the prosecutor and the assistant prosecutor thanked the jury for their services and indicated that they represented the state and the two defense counsels represented the applicant. The Alabama Supreme Court previously ruled that an argument by a prosecutor in a criminal case explaining his relationship to organized society and his duty in prosecuting the case was not wrong. Gallant vs State, 167 Ala. 60, 63, 52 So. 739, 741 (1910). Therefore, we find no error in the prosecutor’s statement.
The applicant submits that the public prosecutor presented facts which were not proven but which he knew because of his better knowledge of the case. Specifically, the complainant refers to the comments: “I know that she took many more photos than those contained here.” The records show that the prosecutor referred to a doctor’s autopsy report and that the report mentioned more photographs than were actually offered and admitted into evidence. Since the report was admitted in evidence, the applicant did not argue with unproven facts. While a prosecutor may not state unproven facts during his argument before a jury, he can comment on the reasonable conclusions he has drawn from the evidence, and he can draw conclusions from the evidence based on his own reasoning. Johnson v. State, 541 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989).
The applicant submits that the public prosecutor wrongly described the defense counsel as “businessmen of reasonable doubt”. However, the records indicate that this comment was merely a sort of response to defense counsel’s closing argument, which had emphasized that the state had failed to pass the standard of reasonable doubt. Bui v. State, 551 So. 2d 1094, 1111-12 (Ala. Cr.App.1988), confirmed, 551 So. 2d 1125 (Ala.1989), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1613, 113 L.Ed. 2d 712 (1991). The comment wasn’t a mistake. See United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849, 106 S. Ct. 144, 88 L.Ed. 2d 119 (1987) (whereby a prosecutor’s description of the defendants’ defense as “incredible and ridiculous” was not considered inflammatory). See also James v. State, 564 So. 2d 1002 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) (where the prosecutor commented, “Look at the defendant sitting there smiling after committing the crime”); Watson v. State, 398 So. 2d 320 (Ala.Cr. *570 App.1980), order denied, 398 So. 2d 332 (Ala. 1980), authenticated. denied, 452 US 941, 101 S. Ct. 3085, 69 L.Ed. 2d 955 (1981) (with the prosecutor calling the defendant a “bald liar”). See also Haywood v. State, 501 So. 2d 515 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (where the prosecutor noted in his closing argument that underhanded tricks to destroy the truth occurred during the trial).
The applicant argues that the prosecutor used his experience and expertise to convince the jury of the validity of the state’s petition. He cites the following separate comments from the prosecutor in support of his position:
“[H]e [the applicant] lays pretty much everything on Mr. Parker in his testimony … it is not unusual for a person to have committed an offense and to have committed that offense together with another person. It is quite common to tell this story in the light that is most favorable to them, there is nothing unusual in that.” “But when they tell the story, they always tell the story in the light that is most favorable to themselves. They always tell the story in the light that’s best for themselves.” “It’s not uncommon at a crime scene like this, a crime scene where a person is still alive, to hear this gurgling sound of a person who still trying to force air into her lungs.”
None of the comments cited above are inappropriate. The records show that the prosecutor, in the first two comments relating to the applicant’s testimony, remarked to the jury that they should use their common sense to determine that the defendant’s testimony was not unusual. Furthermore, the applicant’s third observation was a correct conclusion from the evidence, as a State expert had testified that upon examination of the victim’s internal organs after her admission to the hospital, there was some blood in her lungs, suggesting that she had kept breathing after being hurt internally. The expert stated that the blood had been forcibly sucked into the lungs; therefore, the prosecutor could reasonably conclude that the victim had made gurgling noises while doing so.
“The statements of the prosecutor are not evidence. henry v State, 468 So. 2d 896, 899 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), attestation denied, 468 So. 2d 902 (Ala.1985). Further, prosecutors are required to exercise wide latitude in their admonitions to the jury. Varner v. State, 418 So. 2d 961 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) “Statements by counsel must be considered as being in the heat of debate and must be evaluated for their true merit and not as factors in the formation of judgment.” Orr v. State, 462 So. 2d 1013 1016 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).”
Armstrong v. State, 516 So. 2d 806, 809 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).
“The test of a prosecutor’s legitimate argument is that anything based on fact and evidence is within the bounds of proper comment and argument. Kirkland v. State, 340 So. 2d 1139 (Ala. Cr. App.), Certification Denied, 340 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1976). Statements based on facts that are admissible in evidence are correct. Henley v. State, 361 So. 2d 1148 (Ala.Cr.App.), Attestation denied, 361 So. 2d 1152 (Ala.1978). Both the prosecutor and the defense attorney have the right to present their impressions of the evidence. He can argue any valid conclusion from the evidence and examine, assemble, sift through and treat the evidence in his own way. Williams v . State, 377 So. 2d 634 (Ala.Cr.App.1979); McQueen v. State, 355 So. 2d 407 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978).”
Watson v. State, 398 So. 2d 320, 328 (Ala. Cr.App.1980), pleading rejected, 398 So. 2d 332 (Ala.1981), cert. denied, 452 US 941, 101 S. Ct. 3085, 69 L.Ed. 2d 955 (1981).
The applicant alleges that the public prosecutor’s office commented incorrectly on the investigations in this case. The prosecutor commented on the law enforcement officers’ good job in investigating the crime. Such comments were seen as reasonable conclusions from the evidence and not as unduly empowering the state’s witnesses. Henderson v. State, 584 So. 2d 841 (Ala.Cr.App.1989); Ex parte Waldrop, 459 So. 2d 959, 961 (Ala.1984), Cert. denied, 471 US 1030, 105 S. Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed. 2d 323 (1985).
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s comment that the testimony of one of the defense witnesses was “astonishing” and his comment that the witness was “attempting to mislead the jury” were correct inferences from the evidence. See Watson v. State, op. See Lundy v. State, 568 So. 2d 399 (Ala.Cr. App.1990) (where the prosecutor’s comment during closing argument in a capital murder indictment that the state’s witnesses had sworn to tell the truth, and the truth have said was deemed admissible). See also Cross v. State, 536 So. 2d 155 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988).
The applicant argues that the prosecutor miscommented on the applicant’s failure to testify by describing the State’s case as uncontested. The applicant cites the following comments from the prosecutor: “I do not see that anything contradicts the State’s case, the State’s evidence in this case”; and “[t]he evidence in this case goes well beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt.” An examination of the context of the prosecutor’s statements clearly shows that the prosecutor strictly referred to the irrefutable nature of the evidence presented and could in no way comment on the applicant’s omission. “A prosecutor has an opportunity to comment on the fact that the state’s evidence is uncontested or uncontested. Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 682, 320 So. 2d 727, 734 (1975). However, a prosecutor may not make comments that cross the line drawn by an accused’s right not to testify in court. Beecher, 294 Ala. at 682, 320 So. 2d at 734.” Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d 852, 853 (Ala. 1984). The Alabama Supreme Court found in Ex parte Dobard, 435 So. 2d 1351, 1359 (Ala. 1983), cert denied, 464 US 1063, 104 S. Ct. 745, 79 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1984):
“'[W]hen there is a possibility that a prosecutor’s remark could be taken by the jury as indicating an omission on the part of the accused, a violation of Section 6 [Const. of Ala. of 1901].’ Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 682, 320 So. 2d 727, 734 (1975) In addition, we found in Beecher:
“If the state’s evidence is unchallenged, the prosecutor has the right to call the jury’s attention. In these circumstances, the prosecutor might say: “There was no refutation of the evidence presented by the State”; more simply, “The State’s evidence is unchallenged,” or any other appropriate comment of similar effect.’ ID.
“We believe that the prosecutor’s statements in question could not be taken as an indication of the defendant’s failure to testify, but fall squarely within the limits authorized by Beecher.”
Also in the present case, as the prosecutor noted, the state’s evidence was unchallenged. The applicant has never denied involvement in the offence; he only raised the question of the extent of his involvement. The State conceded through its evidence that there was no way of ascertaining which participant committed which acts, but it proved that the complainant was actually present and involved.
The applicant also argues that the prosecutor wrongly implied that the defense had a responsibility to present certain evidence, commenting that “they can answer questions just like we can… You can get them a subpoena and bring them here and they.” ask what they know about it.” The applicant argues that the prosecutor made a further error in commenting that the defendants had not presented evidence or otherwise explained that there was “something wrong” with the applicant , which prompted him to commit the murder. This latter remark was also an appropriate reference to the unchallenged *572 nature of the State’s evidence. Beecher v. State, supra. Regarding the first comment, the full context of the comment is as follows :
“That’s not even consistent if the truck was moved, that doesn’t even agree with their own theory. And they can’t tell you where the truck went; they just want to raise the question and not give you an answer. You can answer questions just like we can. [Defense Attorney] says witnesses won’t talk to him the way they talk to us, but heck you can give them a subpoena and bring them up and ask them what they know about it… They have subpoena powers just like us. Sie hätten all diese Leute in Bezug auf diese Zeiten vorladen können, wenn sie wirklich dieser Theorie nachgehen wollten, und wir hätten das auch tun können. Aber es ist unwesentlich, es macht nichts irgendein Unterschied; es gibt so viele Beweise für das Gegenteil, dass es eine andere Fantasie ist.
Die Bemerkungen des Staatsanwalts stellten eine Art Antwort auf die Erklärung des Verteidigers während seiner Schließung dar, dass die Zeugen nicht mit ihm, sondern mit dem Staatsanwalt sprechen würden. Siehe Bui gegen State, oben. Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass der Staatsanwalt bei dieser Bemerkung auch erklärte, dass die Staatsanwaltschaft auch diese Zeugen hätte laden können. Wir finden keinen Fehler in den Ausführungen des Staatsanwalts.
Der Beschwerdeführer macht geltend, der Staatsanwalt habe sich wie folgt unzutreffend geäußert:
„Sie haben die Bilder gesehen und sie sind schrecklich, sie sind schrecklich. Und Sie werden die Gelegenheit haben, wenn Sie sie sich noch einmal ansehen möchten, sicherlich dazu. Ich bin jetzt seit dreizehn Jahren an der Strafverfolgung beteiligt, und ich kann ehrlich sagen, dass dieser Fall einer der grausamsten und schrecklichsten [Fälle] ist, an denen ich je beteiligt war. Ich kann das ohne jeden Zweifel sagen. Mrs. Sennett erlitt einen schrecklichen, schrecklichen Tod.“
Dieser Kommentar basierte auf einer legitimen Schlussfolgerung aus den Beweismitteln und stellte keine unzulässige Einmischung in die persönliche Meinung des Staatsanwalts dar. Die Grausamkeit dieses Verbrechens wurde durch die Aufnahme der Bilder sowie durch die Zeugenaussagen am Tatort und die Aussage des Arztes zum Zustand der Leiche des Opfers deutlich. „Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass es keinen Rechtsstandard gibt, um die nachteiligen Eigenschaften angeblich unangemessener Kommentare einer der Parteien zu beurteilen. Dies muss im Lichte der Probleme, Parteien und allgemeinen Umstände des jeweiligen Falls geprüft werden.“ Zimmermann gegen Staat, 404 So. 2d 89, 97 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. verweigert, 404 So. 2d 100 (Ala.1981) und darin zitierte Fälle. Siehe auch Smith gegen State, 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (Kommentar der Staatsanwaltschaft, dass der Angeklagte einer der schlimmsten war, der jemals in den Bezirk eingetreten ist, wurde in der Hitze der Debatte gemacht, war kein Einwurf persönlicher Erfahrung und tat es auch nicht einen schlichten Irrtum darstellen).
Der Beschwerdeführer macht auch sechs Bemerkungen des Staatsanwalts während der Strafphase des Prozesses als Fehler geltend. Da gegen keinen dieser Kommentare vor Gericht Einwände erhoben wurden, müssen die Kommentare, um einen umkehrbaren Fehler darzustellen, auf die Ebene eines einfachen Fehlers ansteigen. Regel 45A, A.R.App.P.
Der Beschwerdeführer behauptet, dass der Staatsanwalt die Geschworenen unrechtmäßig dazu ermutigt habe, das Todesurteil aufgrund der Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen des Verbrechens auf die Familie des Opfers zu verhängen, was eine Verletzung von Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987) und South Carolina gegen Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1989). Diese Frage wurde jedoch zu Ungunsten des Beschwerdeführers entschieden. Siehe McWilliams gegen State, [Ms. 6 Div. 190, 23. August 1991], 1991 WL 18448 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), zitiert Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991).
Der Beschwerdeführer argumentiert auch, dass der Staatsanwalt während der Strafphase gegenüber den Geschworenen die folgende unzulässige Bemerkung gemacht habe: „Er [der Beschwerdeführer] hat Sie gebeten, sein Leben zu verschonen, aber er hat dem Opfer in diesem Fall nie die Gelegenheit gegeben, um ihr Leben zu bitten verschont.” Dieser Kommentar ist jedoch eine korrekte Schlussfolgerung aus den Beweisen. Der Beschwerdeführer hat während der Urteilsverkündung vor den Geschworenen ausgesagt. Beim Kreuzverhör *573 fragte der Staatsanwalt den Beschwerdeführer, ob er dem Opfer erlaubt habe, um ihr Leben zu bitten, und der Beschwerdeführer antwortete, dass er dies nicht getan habe. Bei der direkten Prüfung bat der Beschwerdeführer die Geschworenen, sein Leben zu verschonen. Staatsanwälte können Schlussfolgerungen aus den Beweisen ordnungsgemäß kommentieren und auf der Grundlage ihrer eigenen Argumentation Schlussfolgerungen aus den Beweisen ziehen. Holladay gegen Staat, 549 So. 2d 122 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), bestätigt, 549 So. 2d 135 (Ala.), Zert. verweigert, 493 US 1012, 110 S. Ct. 575, 107 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1989).
Der Beschwerdeführer wendet sich gegen den unterstrichenen Teil der folgenden Bemerkungen:
„Wissen Sie, wir haben gehört, dass Mr. Smith eine spirituelle Bekehrung hatte, und ich hoffe, das hat er. Ich hoffe sehr, dass das der Fall ist, und Sie haben einige Kommentare gehört, dass er Reue für das gezeigt hat, was er getan hat; dass er has shown some regret for his part in this horrible act. And again, I hope that is true and I hope that he has and does have remorse for what he did. Ladies and gentlemen, thatthose two things are all fine and well, and as I said, I hope they are both true. But that does not change the fact that he does owe a debt to society. The State of Alabama has the right to exact and demand the appropriate punishment against him.”
The appellant argues that these comments precluded the jury from considering the mitigating evidence which he presented. However, the record shows that the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on all statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and instructed that a mitigating circumstance should be based on the evidence. This comment in no way restricted the jury’s consideration of the mitigating circumstances presented or the alternative punishment of life without parole. These remarks simply were the prosecutor’s legitimate inference from the evidence, were made in the heat of debate, and constituted nothing more than an acceptable appeal for law enforcement, which is permissible in closing argument. See Henderson v. State, supra.
The appellant contends that the prosecutor erred in making the following statement during the penalty phase, “I don’t think I’ve heard anything, anything in this phase of the case that justifies what this individual did.” The appellant argues that this comment improperly shifted the burden to the appellant to justify his crime. The record reveals that, during the penalty phase before the jury, the appellant presented the testimony of two family members and two witnesses who knew the appellant when he was in school, all of whom testified concerning the appellant’s character. The appellant then testified in his own behalf, stating that he was very remorseful for what he had done. Thus, the prosecutor’s comment concerning justification was a proper inference to be drawn from the evidence. Watson v. State, supra.
The appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly commented as follows:
“His only motive in this caseit would be different, it might be slightly different if it was something other than money. But I think the aggravating circumstance in this case is even weightier and I think there are more aspects to it, more substance to it, due to the fact that he didn’t even know, didn’t even know the person whose life he was going to take.”
The appellant argues that the prosecutor was improperly urging the jury to find a statutory aggravating circumstance, where no evidence concerning that circumstance had been introduced, citing Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1408 (11th Cir.1985), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S. Ct. 3325, 92 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1986). The record indicates that the State relied on the single statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. Both the prosecutor and the trial court informed the jury of this fact. The prosecutor’s comment was merely that the single aggravating factor which was presented, that the murder was for pecuniary gain, was deserving of great weight, in light of the circumstances of the case. “`[W]hat is important at the selection stage [of the statutory aggravating circumstances] is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the *574 individual and the circumstances of the crime.’ (Emphasis in original.)” Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), affirmed, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991), quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983). None of the comments cited by the appellant during the guilt or penalty phases of the trial rose to the level of plain error, pursuant to Rule 45A, A.R.App.P.
IV
The appellant argues that the trial court’s answer to a question by the jury during the sentencing phase misled the jury as to its role and violated the appellant’s right to the reliable determination of sentence. The juror’s question was: “Your Honor, if we sentence this man to death, then at your discretion, you can change it upon sentencing, is that correct?” The judge then responded, “Yes, sir.” The juror asked, “If we sentence him to life without parole, can you still sentence him to death?” The judge responded, “Yes, sir.” The appellant argues that this response led the jury to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the appellant’s death does not rest with the jury, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985). The trial court in no way implied that the jury’s decision would be of no consequence or that it would have no influence on the verdict, as the appellant argues.
“This argument was put to rest in Martin v. State, 548 So.2d [488] at 494 [Ala.Cr.App.1988].
“`Under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2639, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985), “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” However, the comments of the prosecutor and the instructions of the trial court accurately informing a jury of the extent of its sentencing authority and that its sentencing verdict was “advisory” and a “recommendation” and that the trial court would make the final decision as to sentence does not violate Caldwell. “[C]omments which accurately explain the respective functions of the Judge and jury are permissible under Caldwell `as long as the significance of [the jury’s] recommendation is adequately stressed.'” Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1101 (11th Cir.1987). Here, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court misrepresented the effect of the jury’s sentencing recommendation. The cases of Caldwell, supra; Mann v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir.), vacated, 828 F.2d 1498 (1987); Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986), modified, Adams v. Duggar, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.1987), and Harich, supra, each involved a situation where the prosecutor and the trial court misled the jury as to its critical role in sentencing under state law. In Hooks v. State, 534 So. 2d 329 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), this Court reviewed the decisions of other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue and concluded: “the trial judge’s and the prosecutor’s remarks clearly define the jury’s role in this sentencing scheme. Thus, the jury could not have been confused as to its responsibility in the sentencing process. The remarks made here were a correct statement of the law and did not tend to mislead or misinform the jury. Therefore, we conclude the remarks were not improper under Caldwell, supra.”‘
“The present cause is indistinguishable from Martin. The challenged comments were not contrary to Caldwell v. Mississippi. See also Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d at 501.”
Smith v. State, 581 So. 2d 497, 519-20 (Ala. Cr.App.1990), reversed on other grounds, Ex parte Smith, 581 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991).
Similarly, in the present case, the trial court in no way misled the jury as to its role in sentencing. The remarks made by the trial court correctly stated the law and in no way misinformed the jury.
*575 V
The appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of reckless murder and reckless manslaughter. While it is clear that an accused in Alabama has a right to have the jury charged on any lesser included offense if, based on the evidence presented, there is a reasonable theory to support that charge, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980), there was no reasonable theory, based on the evidence presented here, to support a charge on either of these lesser included offenses. The evidence clearly indicated that the criminal conduct was directed solely at the victim. Because reckless murder requires conduct creating a grave risk of death to human life in general or universal malice, the evidence did not support such a charge. See Northington v. State, 413 So. 2d 1169, 1170-72 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), cert. quashed, 413 So. 2d 1172 (Ala.1982) (“the function of this section [§ 13A-6-2(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975] is to embrace those homicides caused by such acts as driving an automobile in a grossly wanton manner, shooting a firearm into a crowd or moving train, and throwing a timber from a roof onto a crowded street” Id. at 1172).
Moreover, the evidence did not support a charge on reckless manslaughter. The appellant argues that because his theory of the case was that he and his accomplice had intended only to hurt or frighten the victim and not to kill her, the jury could have believed that he had no intent to kill although he did in fact cause the victim’s death by his conduct. However, the evidence clearly indicates that the appellant’s conduct toward the victim was intentional. His confession states that he knew that the victim was to be murdered; there was evidence that, prior to the offense the appellant and his accomplice were looking for a gun with which to commit the offense; and the nature and circumstances of the offense further indicate that the offense was intentional. The only evidence introduced that tended to show that the appellant believed that the victim was only to be assaulted and frightened clearly related to the initial phases of the accomplices’ planning. Furthermore, although not raised by the appellant, there was no evidence of intoxication to warrant a charge on reckless manslaughter. Barnett v. State, 540 So. 2d 810 (Ala.Cr.App.1988). Because the appellant’s admitted actions were inconsistent with recklessness, no such charge was warranted under the evidence presented.
VI
The appellant argues that the statement he made to police officers following his arrest violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and, therefore, should have been suppressed. Specifically, the appellant argues that he was misled into giving this statement, because the investigator informed him only that he was being questioned about the stolen videocassette recorder, rather than about the murder. A suppression hearing was held prior to trial, and the trial court held that the appellant’s confession was admissible. The evidence showed that the victim was murdered in her home and that a Samsung videocassette recorder was taken from the victim’s home at that time. Subsequently a search warrant was executed at the appellant’s residence and a videocassette recorder, with serial numbers matching that of the videocassette recorder taken from the victim’s residence was discovered. The appellant was then taken into custody and was advised of his rights, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), while sitting in a police car in front of his house. The appellant was told that he was being taken into custody and that he would be questioned about the stolen videocassette recorder. The officer testified that in his opinion the appellant was not intoxicated. The appellant was taken to the Colbert County Sheriff’s Office, and his girlfriend was allowed to ride in the car with him. The appellant stated that he did not wish to invoke any of his rights, and he did not request an attorney. Upon arrival at the Colbert County courthouse, the appellant was taken to the investigator’s office and *576 was again advised of his Miranda rights from a standard waiver form. Handwritten at the top of the form was “Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett Homicide.” The appellant read and signed the form, waiving his rights and indicating that he wished to make a statement. He was informed that the questioning pertained to the videocassette recorder that was taken from the victim’s house when she was killed. The investigator and another officer testified that no one threatened, intimidated, promised anything to, or coerced the appellant in order to get his statement.
The appellant contends that he was misled because he was informed that he was only being questioned concerning the stolen videocassette recorder. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 575-77, 107 S. Ct. 851, 858-59, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987), the defendant argued that an agent’s failure to inform him that he would be questioned about the murder constituted official “trickery” sufficient to invalidate his waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court held:
“This Court has never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is `trickery’ sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights, and we expressly decline so to hold today. “Once Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the nature of his constitutional right `his right to refuse to answer any question which might incriminate him.’ United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 , 188 [97 S. Ct. 1814, 1819, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238] (1977). `Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.’ Ibid. We have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information `useful’ in making his decision or all information that `might … affec[t] his decision to confess.’ Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. [412], 422 [106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410] [1986]. `[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his selfinterest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.’ Ibid. Here the additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature. Accordingly, the failure of the law enforcement official to inform [the defendant] of the subject matter of the interrogation could not affect [the defendant’s] decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant manner.”
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. at 576-77, 107 S. Ct. at 858-59.
Similarly, in the present case, the investigator’s informing the appellant that he would be questioned concerning the stolen videocassette recorder, rather than concerning the murder, could only affect the “wisdom of a Miranda waiver” and not its “voluntary and knowing nature.” Ausweis. Moreover, a reasonable inference from the evidence presented through the investigator’s testimony was that, prior to making his confession, the appellant was informed that the videocassette recorder in question had been taken from the victim’s house during the murder. In Colorado v. Spring, supra, the United States Supreme Court noted that the trial court had made no finding of official trickery and had found:
“`Though it is true that [the agents] did not specifically advise [the defendant] that a part of their interrogation would include questions about the Colorado homicide, the questions themselves suggested the topic of inquiry.’ … According to the Colorado Supreme Court, `it is unclear whether [the defendant] was told by the agents that they wanted to question him specifically about the firearms violations for which he was arrested or whether the agents simply began questioning [the defendant] without making any statement concerning the subject matter of the interrogation. What is clear is that the agents did not tell [the defendant] that they were going to ask him questions about the killing of [the *577 victim] before [the defendant] made his original decision to waive his Miranda rights.’ [People v. Spring] 713 P.2d [865,] 871 [Colo.1985].”
Colorado v. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at 575 n. 7, 107 S. Ct. at 858 n. 7. As in Colorado v. Spring, supra, the murder and the theft were part of the res gestae and the evidentiary facts relating to the two offenses were interwoven. We find no affirmative misrepresentation or trickery which would cause the appellant’s statement to have been unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary.
VII
The appellant argues that the police did not have probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime and, therefore, that they could not constitutionally search his house or arrest him. Consequently, he argues, all of the physical evidence and the statements obtained as a result of the search or his arrest should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. No challenge was made at trial to the search of the appellant’s house or to his arrest; thus, there is no suggestion of illegality as to these matters in the record. Cf. Ex parte Watkins, 509 So. 2d 1074, 1076-77 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S. Ct. 269, 98 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987) (wherein the Court, addressing a claim made pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), which had been neither raised nor preserved in the record, wrote, “The defendant cannot successfully argue that error is plain in the record when there is no indication in the record that the act upon which the error is predicated ever occurred”); White v. State, 587 So. 2d 1218 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), affirmed, 587 So. 2d 1236 (Ala.1991) (wherein this court held that an appellant could not raise a claim pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, supra, where “[t]he record does not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection”).
Moreover, the search of the appellant’s residence was made pursuant to a warrant and thus is to be presumed valid.
“With regard to search warrants, the general rule is that the defendant has the burden of proof in challenging the validity of the execution or service of the search warrant. United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir.1981). `The warrant stands cloaked with the presumption of validity both in the court below and on this appeal. The appellant had the burden of proof in challenging the validity of its execution or service.’ United States v. Vigo, 413 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir.1969).”
Brownlee v. State, 535 So. 2d 217 (Ala.Cr. App.1988), reversed on other grounds, 535 So. 2d 218 (Ala.1988). See also Calhoun v. State, 460 So. 2d 268 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).
As to the appellant’s arrest, the police had probable cause for that arrest under the totality of the circumstances test set out in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), because the videocassette recorder found in the appellant’s residence was determined to have been the videocassette recorder taken from the victim’s home during the murder. See Williams v. State, 565 So. 2d 1233 (Ala. Cr.App.1990), (wherein one of the appellant’s accomplices raised the issue of probable cause to arrest and this court, in the companion case, addressed the probable cause determination under the same factual background now raised).
We find no plain error in the admission of the physical evidence and the appellant’s statement, because we do not find under this record that either the appellant’s arrest or the search of his residence was illegal.
VIII
The appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately question the jurors as to potential prejudice resulting from exposure to a newspaper article about the trial. The record indicates that, after the lunch break on the third day of trial, the following transpired:
“BY THE COURT: Let the record show we are outside the presence of the jury. “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It was pointed out to defense counsel, and I don’t remember *578 by whom, but it was pointed out that one of the jurors in this particular trial walked into the courtroom this morning with a newspaper under his arm. And because of that report, I investigated and looked under the second jury chair in the first row and found a copy of The Birmingham News. And an article, I think, in one of the sections directly related to this case.
“BY THE COURT: In Section E, page one of November 2nd, Birmingham Post Herald.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me, Post Herald. “BY THE COURT: Anything from the State? “[PROSECUTOR]: Let me just say thisthere is no indication … at the present time that anybody has actually read that article. And I would just request that the Court inquire as to whether or not anyone has violated his order with regard to not reading anything about this case. And I think what the Court said, and the record, I think, will bear me out, is that the Court directed the jurors not to read anything or watch anything or listen to anything with regard to this case. I don’t think you put a general ban on them as far as reading the newspaper all together. “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think that’s correct. “[PROSECUTOR]: And I think the matter can be resolved very simply by asking if anyone has read the newspaper about this case, and further admonishing them not to do so. “BY THE COURT: Anything else? “[PROSECUTOR]: In fact, I would agree to this, if the Court wants to tell the jury not to bring any newspapers to the courthouse or into the courtroom, that would be fine with me. You know, that might just help us to avoid the possibility of someone seeing such an article. “BY THE COURT: Anything else? “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t want to blow it out of proportion, but, you know, I sure would like to know whether that particular juror has read this article or not. “BY THE COURT: Well, I will ask them in general if anyone has read any article. I don’t know that I want to pick someone out unless I get a response. “…. “[PROSECUTOR]: I think it ought to be a general question; I don’t think you have to ostracize the man or “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I realize I’m risking turning that man off, but still “[PROSECUTOR]: Nobody has to know who the information came from. “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Still in the interest of my client, I really have to find out whether he has been prejudiced by that particular article. “BY THE COURT: Well, if we get no response, that would be the end of the matter. “[PROSECUTOR]: Let’s let the Judge ask the question. “BY THE COURT: Bring the jury in, please.
“(At this time the jury returned to courtroom)
“BY THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during the trial of this case, I’ve instructed you not to do certain things, you know, such as I asked you to stay outside the courtroom and not to read anything about this case or listen to any news broadcasts. I would like to ask you if anyone on this jury has read any article in any newspaper about this case?
“(There was no response)
“BY THE COURT: Okay, I would like to further instruct you not to bring newspapers into the courtroom and I would like to ask you not to read any newspaper until after the conclusion of this case. It is very important that you follow these instructions and what I’ve just told you and the ones I’ve given to you previously. I’ll be glad to explain all that to you at the conclusion of the entire case.”
Thus, the trial court questioned the jury as to whether any member had read an article pertaining to the trial and the juror response *579 indicated that no one had read such an article.
“Jurors should not be permitted, while in the discharge of their duty, to read newspapers containing statements of fact pertaining to the trial. Leith v. State, 206 Ala. 439, 444, 90 So. 687 (1921). `However, the fact that a juror has read a newspaper in which the case is discussed does not entitle the defendant to an automatic mistrial.’ Wiggins v. State, 429 So. 2d 666 , 668 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).”
Thomas v. State, 473 So. 2d 627, 631 (Ala. Cr.App.1985).
“`Even where the jurors receive newspaper accounts of, or comments on, the case, the verdict will not be disturbed if the papers contain nothing calculated to mislead or improperly affect their minds or to prejudice their verdict, or if the court is satisfied that none of the jurors were influenced thereby. The court is not required to discharge the jury or to reverse the verdict because of a newspaper article, which, it is satisfied, the jurors have neither seen nor heard….’
“23 A.C.J.S.Crim.Law § 1364 (1961).”
Wiggins v. State, 429 So. 2d 666, 668 (Ala. Cr.App.1983).
Because there has been no showing that any juror saw any prejudicial newspaper article, and because the defense counsel acquiesced in the trial court’s instructions and raised no objection, we find no error in the trial court’s instructions.
IX
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to individually voir dire the jury panel. In the present case, the jury panel of 50 potential jurors were voir dired together. The appellant argues that he was prejudiced thereby because the case was highly publicized and because he was hampered from asking specific questions, which he argues were important to the selection of a jury in a capital offense. However, the record indicates that this cause had been transferred from Colbert County to Jefferson County, pursuant to a motion for change of venue. When the panel was questioned, no one on the jury panel indicated any knowledge of any of the facts of this case. See Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), affirmed, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991). Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the questioning was inhibited or confined in any manner. The fact that the appellant’s case involved capital murder is not alone reason to require individual voir dire. See e.g. Kuenzel v. State, supra; Henderson v. State, supra; Hallford v. State, 548 So. 2d 526, 538-39 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), affirmed, 548 So. 2d 547 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945, 110 S. Ct. 354, 107 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989). A trial court’s decision in denying individual voir dire examination of a jury panel will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Kuenzel v. State, supra; Henderson v. State, supra; Hallford v. State, supra, at 539. We find no abuse of discretion in this case.
The appellant argues that the admission into evidence of photographs which were allegedly inflammatory, prejudicial, redundant, and without probative value, requires reversal in this case. The appellant refers to photographs of the crime scene, as well as photographs of the victim’s body during autopsy.
“Photographs are admissible into evidence within the discretion of the trial judge and will be reviewed on appeal only to determine if there has been an abuse of that discretion. Fletcher v. State, 291 Ala. 67, 277 So. 2d 882 (1973).
“Photographs are admissible if they tend to prove or disprove some disputed or material issue, to illustrate or elucidate some other relevant fact or evidence, or to corroborate or disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered. Baldwin v. State, 282 Ala. 653, 213 So. 2d 819 (1968). The fact that a photograph is gruesome is not grounds to exclude it as long as the photograph sheds light on issues being tried. Magwood v. State, 494 So. 2d 124 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), aff’d, Ex parte Magwood, 494 So. 2d 154 (Ala. *580 1986), cert. denied, Magwood v. Alabama, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S. Ct. 599, 93 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1986).
“Some of the photographs in issue here depicted wounds to the back and neck area of the deceased. The State argues that the photographs were credible evidence for the jury to view in order to determine whether a pocketknife or a larger knife that was found at the scene could have inflicted the depicted wounds. Based on the record, we agree. “…. “This court has held that a capital murder by multiple stab wounds is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Dunkins v. State, 437 So. 2d 1349 (Ala.Cr. App.1982), aff’d, Ex parte Dunkins, 437 So. 2d 1356 (Ala.1983). As noted earlier, photographs depicting the character and location of wounds on a deceased’s body are admissible even though they are cumulative and are based on undisputed matters. Magwood, 494 So.2d [124] 141 [Ala.Cr.App.1985]. The fact that a photograph is gruesome is not grounds to exclude it as long as the photograph sheds light on issues being tried. Id. Also a photograph may be gruesome and ghastly, but this is not a reason to exclude it as long as the photograph is relevant to the proceedings, even if it tends to inflame the jury. Id.”
Ex parte Bankhead, 585 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1991).
In the present case, during the crossexamination of the physician who treated the victim upon her arrival at the hospital, as well as during the cross-examination of the coroner, the appellant raised the question as to whether or not different knives were used to inflict the stab wounds. Apparently the appellant’s purpose was to suggest that Charles Sennett had returned home after the appellant and Parker had left to find the victim still alive and that he had then killed her by stabbing her with another knife. Thus, the nature of the knife wounds became relevant. Moreover, during trial the State emphasized the fact that the appellant’s statement was corroborated by these photographs as independent evidence. This court has viewed the copies of the photographs which are contained in the record and finds no error in their admission at trial.
XI
The appellant argues that he was denied a fair trial because his first attorney negotiated and accepted a job with the Lauderdale County prosecutor’s office while he was preparing the appellant’s case for trial, without informing the appellant of this alleged conflict of interest. The record indicates that the appellant’s first attorney immediately moved to withdraw as the appellant’s counsel upon being offered and accepting a job with the Lauderdale County prosecutor’s office. The motion was granted by the trial court, and new counsel was appointed to represent the appellant. The appellant’s allegation of conflict of interest is based solely on the fact that during a period of time his first attorney was representing him while he was negotiating a job with the prosecutor’s office in a contiguous county. The appellant refers to no specific actions by the attorney which prejudiced the appellant and, thus, he has failed to establish that an actual conflict of interest existed. See United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991, 104 S. Ct. 481, 78 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1983); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980).
“We will not find an actual conflict unless appellants point to `specific instances in the record to suggest an actual conflict or impairment of their interest.’ United States v. Fox, 613 F.2d [99] at 102 [5th Cir.1980]. Appellants must make a factual showing of inconsistent interest and must demonstrate that the attorney `made a choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but harmful to the other. If he did not make such a choice, the conflict remained hypothetical.’ Comment, 68 J.Crim.L. and Criminology, supra, at 232 (parenthesis in original). There is no violation where the conflict is `irrelevant or merely hypothetical’; there must be *581 an `actual significant conflict.’ Foxworth [v. Wainwright], 516 F.2d [1072] at 1077 n. 7 [5th Cir.1975].”
United States v. Mers, supra, at 1328.
In Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 858, 866-68 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), a court-appointed attorney withdrew from representing the defendant because he accepted a position as an assistant district attorney. The defendant, in that case, argued that because the attorney was subject to divided loyalties, an actual conflict of interest existed. This court noted that the attorney did not take part, in any manner, in the prosecution of the defendant’s case after accepting the job as assistant district attorney. However, the cause was remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether an actual conflict existed. On return to remand, the trial court held that no actual conflict existed because the attorney brought no files or records pertaining to the defendant’s case to the district attorney’s office, did not consult with the district attorney concerning the defendant’s case, did not reveal any information he had ascertained from the defendant to the district attorney’s office, did not discuss the defendant’s case with any attorney who actively prosecuted, or participated in any manner, in the defendant’s trial, and did not obtain any exculpatory information while serving as defendant’s attorney.
In the present case, the appellant’s prior attorney did not join the district attorney’s office in the county in which the appellant was being prosecuted; thus, he took no role in the appellant’s prosecution. There is no indication that he spoke with, or in any way aided, any of the prosecutors from Colbert County. We find no actual conflict of interest in this case. See also Crawford v. State, 479 So. 2d 1349, 1355 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985).
XII
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce testimony concerning hair fibers found at the scene, without proving the chain of custody for the fibers and without introducing the fibers into evidence. The record indicates that on the day of the offense Investigator Doug Hargett, of the Colbert County Sheriff’s Department, took into custody an afghan that was partially covering the victim’s body and a baseballtype cap that was found near the body. Investigator Hargett testified that both of these items remained in his possession or under his control until he delivered them to John Kilbourn at the Huntsville forensic laboratory. Kilbourn testified that he examined the afghan and the cap and removed some hairs from both of them. He compared these hairs to known samples of the appellant’s hair, as well as to hair samples from John Parker, the appellant’s accomplice. Kilbourn found hairs from the afghan and the cap to be consistent with the samples of the appellant’s hair. Although Kilbourn testified concerning the results of his examination, there is no indication in the record as to the whereabouts of the hairs and the State did not offer them into evidence.
The appellant’s allegations concerning a broken chain of custody refers to the custody of this evidence after Kilbourn’s analysis. However, “the law is concerned with tracing the integrity of the substance only up through the completion of the analysis.” Congo v. State, 409 So. 2d 475, 479 (Ala.Cr. App.1981), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 276 (Ala. 1982).
“The purpose of establishing a chain of custody is to show a reasonable probability that there has been no tampering with the item of evidence. Williams v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 375 So. 2d 1257, cert. denied, Ala., 375 So. 2d 1271 (1979). Each link in the chain of custody here, from appellant through the [expert], was firmly established. The State presented `ample assurance of the authority of the evidence,’ Yarbrough v. State, Ala., 375 So. 2d 1231 (1979), up to and including the time when the [evidence was] tested. That is all the law requires. See Taylor v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 372 So. 2d 387 (1979).” Ausweis. See also Boggan v. State, 455 So. 2d 228 (Ala.Cr.App.1984) (wherein the prosecutor established sufficient chain of custody *582 of a shirt, which was allegedly worn by the defendant at the time of the crime, to warrant reception of testimony regarding results of chemical analysis of bloodstains found on the shirt). Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the appellant ever requested these hair samples or that he did not receive them, as a matter of discovery, or that he was denied access to them for the purpose of conducting an independent test, Moton v. State, 524 So. 2d 381 (Ala.Cr.App.1988). Furthermore, the appellant made no objection at trial to the expert’s testimony or to the State’s failure to produce or admit the hairs into evidence. There is no indication that the appellant suffered any prejudice because these hairs were not admitted into evidence. XIII
The appellant, who is white, argues that this cause must be remanded in order to supplement the record with regard to jury strikes. The record contains no indication of the racial composition of the venire or of the strikes made by either party. However, during the sentencing of the appellant by the trial judge, the judge stated that one black had served on the jury. The record further indicates that, prior to any questioning of the jury venire, and while making his motion for individual voir dire, the defense counsel stated that one of his reasons for requesting individual voir dire was to guard against any racial prejudice. However, after the jury was struck, no objection to the composition of the jury was made. During the motion for new trial by the appellant, defense counsel, who had not represented the appellant during trial, stated:
“And finally, Judge, there are some cases that are being decided just about every day in the country concerning the Batson case, which you are familiar with, and which I think you had some exposure to last week; that Batson case would apply to white defendants. And it is my understanding that in this jury venire there werewas a great number of minorities, whether black or other minorities, and these were struck and no explanation was required of the State as to why these particular potential jurors were struck and it is our position that the Batson case would apply in the situation, and that there was only one black juror on this particular jury that was selected to hear this case.”
The prosecutor, thereafter, responded to the defense counsel’s claims and stated, in pertinent part:
“The Batson case, if he is alleging that that amounts to incompetence of counsel, you know, the case that he makes reference to that saysand it’s not even the law now that it applies as to white defendants who are not members of a recognized minority group. But there is an indication that that’s what the law is going to be. But at the time that this case was tried, even the first supreme court case relating to that subject had not been decided. So if they are alleging on that basis that counsel was inadequate, there was no way for the defense attorneys to have a crystal ball and know what the supreme court was going to decide, you know, three months later. “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I wasn’t saying there was an inadequacy of counsel, the Batson thing. That was just an issue I brought up and it didn’t have anything to do with defense counsel. “[PROSECUTOR]: Well, under the law at the time, there was no prima facie showing made and there was certainly no meaningful or purposeful discrimination on the part of the State in this case. There was no way for us to know what the law is going to be several months, several months afterwards.”
The trial court subsequently denied the motion for new trial.
Thereafter, the appellant was appointed new counsel to represent him on appeal, and that counsel moved to supplement the record, requesting a number of items of evidence. He further filed a second motion to supplement the record. The trial court granted the appellant’s motions and ordered, in pertinent part, that the clerk or court reporter include in the record “the strike list or other evidence showing the *583 names and race of each person who was present for jury service at the time of Mr. Smith’s jury was selected [sic], as well as a list of those excused for cause and the strikes by the defendant and the State.” The supplemental record includes a list of strikes indicating the jurors by number that were exercised by each party; however, the names and race of these potential jurors are not included.
Because defense counsel, during the motion for new trial, implied that a number of blacks were struck from the jury panel, without any refutation by the prosecutor, and because the trial court granted the appellant’s motion to supplement the record as to the identity and the race of the jurors struck, we cannot say that there is no inference from the record to support a claim pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, supra, and Powers v. Ohio, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991). In Ex parte Watkins, 509 So. 2d 1074, 1076-77 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S. Ct. 269, 98 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987) the Alabama Supreme Court held that a complaint made pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, supra, could not constitute plain error, where the record did not support such an inference.
“Although the record does show that the defendant is black and the victim was white, it does not show that the state exercised any of its peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors from the venire. The record as a whole simply does not raise an inference that the state was engaged in the practice of purposeful discrimination. Under the plain error rule this Court will `notice any plain error or defect in the proceeding under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the petitioner.’ (Emphasis added.) Rule 39(k), supra. The defendant cannot successfully argue that error is plain in the record when there is no indication in the record that the act upon which error is predicated ever occurred (i.e., the state’s use of its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks). In both [Ex parte] Jackson, [ 516 So. 2d 768 (Ala.1986) ], and [Ex parte] Godbolt, [ 546 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1987),] the records were sufficient to show that prima facie cases of purposeful discrimination could be made by the defendants; therefore, those cases were remanded for determinations on the issue under guidelines set out in Batson.”
Similarly, this court has found that where there was no indication in the record of any purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in exercising peremptory challenges, plain error cannot be found. Kuenzel v. State, supra. In Kuenzel, this court further distinguished Ex parte Jackson, 516 So. 2d 768 (Ala.1986), and Ex parte Godbolt, 546 So. 2d 991 (Ala.1987), on the grounds that, in both cases, “the issue of systematic exclusion of blacks based on racial grounds was raised in the trial court. Here the issue was never raised before the trial court in any manner. On the record before this Court, we find no merit to the defendant’s argument.” Kuenzel, supra, at 486.
In the present case, this matter was raised before the trial court and the trial court took certain actions to resolve the matter. Because the record was never correctly supplemented, this cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make findings of fact regarding the racial composition of the jury venire, as well as the race of the veniremembers struck by the prosecution. The trial court shall determine whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination existed, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, supra. If it did, the trial court is instructed to require the State to come forward with race-neutral reasons for its strikes of those potential black jurors. Thereafter, the trial court shall determine whether the reasons given by the State are sufficiently race neutral pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala.1987).
XIV
In the present case, the trial court failed to enter specific written findings of *584 fact and conclusions of law as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as required by § 13A-5-47(d), Code of Alabama 1975. Although the appellant argues that such an omission requires a reversal, this court has consistently remanded cases in which the court failed to enter written findings of fact summarizing the crime and the defendant’s participation in it. See Richardson v. State, 376 So. 2d 205, 224 (Ala.Cr. App.1978), affirmed, 376 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1979), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1017, 103 S. Ct. 1262, 75 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1983); Murry v. State, 562 So. 2d 1348, 1358, (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), Duren v. State, 507 So. 2d 111, 120-21 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), affirmed, 507 So. 2d 121 (Ala.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 905, 108 S. Ct. 249, 98 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1987). Cf. Ex parte Henderson, 584 So. 2d 862 (Ala.1991) (wherein the Alabama Supreme Court remanded a death case to this court, where this court failed to follow the statutory mandate of § 13A-5-53, Code of Alabama 1975). The trial court’s oral sentencing of the appellant states that “[t]he Court has considered the circumstances in this case and finds that the aggravating circumstances enumerated herein to be present and outweigh the mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant.” “`Without knowing what the trial judge did, [this Court will be] unable to properly review his sentencing decision.’ [Ex parte ] Cochran, 500 So. 2d 1179 (Ala.1985).” Murry v. State, supra, at 1359. Therefore, this cause is due to be remanded to the trial court with order that it enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
All Judges concur.
Alabama man executed in 1988 contract killing – The Andalusia Star-News
ATMORE (AP) — Alabama death row inmate John Forrest Parker, minutes before his execution Thursday, apologized to his victim’s family for the 1988 contract killing of a woman in a plot allegedly orchestrated by her husband, a heavily indebted preacher, was arranged.
The Supreme Court denied a request for a stay minutes before the execution by lethal injection was scheduled to begin at Holman Prison in Atmore. Parker, 42, was pronounced dead at 6:41 p.m., coroners said.
Parker was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, a 45-year-old grandmother who was repeatedly stabbed and beaten with a whistle at her home in Colbert County.
When asked if he had any last words, Parker turned his head to Mike and Charles Sennett, the victim’s sons, and said, “I’m sorry. I never expect you to forgive me. I’m really sorry.”
He then turned his head to a room where a friend, Carolyn Clemons, and several religious advisors were sitting. His voice breaking and on the verge of tears, Parker said, “I appreciate everything. You all know that I love you.”
He then gave a thumbs-up to Clemons, who described herself as Parker’s common-law wife. She sobbed out loud as she watched his body tremble and then go still.
Prosecutors said Parker was one of two men who each paid $1,000 from a third man on behalf of her husband, Rev. Charles Sennett, who was heavily in debt and wanted to collect insurance. He committed suicide a week after killing his wife.
Parker appealed to the US Supreme Court after the Alabama Supreme Court denied his motion for a stay. On appeal, Parker’s attorneys challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that allowed the trial judge to override the jury’s recommendation that Parker be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
The Alabama Attorney General’s Office filed a response saying Parker had made this argument and it had already been dismissed by lower courts and that the trial judge had given sufficient consideration to the jury’s recommendation.
Parker spent most of Thursday hanging out with friends and family, including his mother, Joan Parker, and father, Edward Parker. Spiritual advisors Ben Sherrod, George Thomas Dooley and Taylor Perry sat in the witness room with Clemons.
Jail spokesman Brian Corbett said Parker was quiet and spent some of his time Thursday reading the Bible. Parker had a final meal of fried fish, french fries and iced tea, Corbett said.
He gave his mother most of his belongings, including a gold watch, a mirror, seven postage stamps, and a box of pictures. He gave two nephews a belt and a wallet as gifts.
The family planned to take possession of the body after the execution.
Mike Sennett later said he didn’t know if the apology was sincere.
“He told us he was sorry and that he was young. He’s had 22 years to tell me he’s sorry, and five minutes before he dies he’s telling me. do i believe him Probably not,” he said.
Charles Sennett said that only God knows if Parker was truly repentant.
“He sounded sincere. I don’t know if it was him,” Charles Sennett said.
The brothers said in a written statement that Parker’s silent death on a hospital stretcher was unlike the violent death of their mother at their home 22 years ago.
“The pain he did not feel today is incomparable to the pain he caused our mother,” her statement read.
But Clemons said Parker, whom she had known for more than 30 years, was a compassionate, loving man who did what he did because of drugs and didn’t have to die.
She said she was “devastated and hurt” to see him die. “It was something I will never get past,” she said.
A second man accused of taking part in the attack, Kenneth Eugene Smith, now 44, is also on death row but has no execution date.
Court records show that Rev. Charles Sennett contacted one of his tenants, Billy Gray Williams, about his wife’s murder, and that Williams then paid Parker and Smith $1,000 each. Williams, 43, is serving life in prison without parole.
American Monster Take Me to the River (TV Episode 2018)
When a preacher returns home from church, he finds his wife stabbed and beaten, the apparent victim of a home invasion. The preacher’s alibi is rock solid, and his son’s alibi is solid as well. Anyway… Read all
When a preacher returns home from church, he finds his wife stabbed and beaten, the apparent victim of a home invasion. The preacher’s alibi is rock solid, and his son’s alibi is solid as well. However, .
When a preacher returns home from church, he finds his wife stabbed and beaten, the apparent victim of a home invasion. The preacher’s alibi is rock solid, and his son’s alibi is solid as well. However, .
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