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Ingr Davis of Colorado Springs passed away two years ago. Here’s what we know about the cause of her death.
Close friends believe that Ingr was an amazingly helpful personality. In fact, she was loved by many and hated by very few.
Her professional life is not known to us at this time. Nevertheless, we can confirm that Ingr was full of life and always motivated at work.
What Happened To Ingr Davis From Colorado Springs?
Ingr Davis of Colorado Springs passed away in August 2019. But even after two years, we still have no way of knowing how she died.
Well, it’s been a mystery since Ingr left the world. Her family has not yet spoken about her death.
In fact, after the incent, her household is still unable to continue. Interestingly, no media reported anything about her death.
Still, people who knew her wanted to find out what happened to the lady. Shockingly, we don’t believe an investigation into Ingr’s death is ongoing.
The Davis story has stayed under the radar for so long. But in 2021, netizens have been demanding to find out the truth about Ingr.
Was it a suice? We don’t know anything about that. According to her close friends, she was a brave girl who could never perform such a feat.
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Well, we’re asking the respected authority of Colorado Springs to re-examine Davis’ death. Maybe we can find something that could reveal the cause of death.
Was Ingr Davis Death A Murder? Homice Case Explained
Some netizens are predicting that Ingr Davis’ death is a homice. But it has remained a mystery for more than 2 years.
With no one knowing the cause of her death, people want to file a murder case. Hopefully we’ll find out Ingr’s truth very soon.
So far, officers have not found a suspect. In addition, no person has been arrested to date.
Indeed, the news of Ingr’s death left everyone shocked and perplexed. We will be sure to let you know if there is any news on her murder case.
Are Ingr And Preston Lee Jr Related?
We’re not sure if Ingr Davis and Preston Lee Jr. are related. Since they don’t share the same last name, we believe they aren’t relatives.
According to a Facebook post in 2019, Ingr and Preston died in the same incent. Even after 2 years, her family has not published an obituary.
We know the pain behind the loss of someone. Our team extends our deepest condolences to both households.
New details emerge in deadly Colorado Springs neighbor feud
Images related to the topicNew details emerge in deadly Colorado Springs neighbor feud
See some more details on the topic What Happened To Ingrid Davis From Colorado Springs Murder and Preston Lee Jr Homicide here:
What Happened To Ingrid Davis From Colorado Springs?
Murder and Preston Lee Jr Homice. Ingr Davis from Colorado Springs passed away two years ago. Here’s what we know about the cause of her death.
Source: www.650.org
Date Published: 2/23/2021
View: 9124
Ingrid Davis Colorado Springs Murder Case, Is Preston Lee Jr …
Ingr Davis Colorado Springs Murder Case, Is Preston Lee Jr Still In Jail? … The reason behind the death of Ingr remains a mystery even …
Source: mixedarticle.com
Date Published: 1/16/2021
View: 7929
Who is Ingrid Davis? Colorado Springs Murder Case, Is …
Who is Ingr Davis? – Is Preston Lee Jr still being held in custody? Continue reading to see if he’s linked to the murder of Colorado …
Source: 247newsaroundtheworld.com
Date Published: 3/5/2022
View: 7263
Fatal stabbing victim’s sons ‘all he used to talk about’
Police named Preston Lee Davis as the victim of the fatal stabbing … in connection to the homice and charged with first-degree murder.
Source: www.desmoinesregister.com
Date Published: 8/8/2022
View: 6523
Who is Ingrid Davis Colorado Springs Murder Case, Is Preston Lee Jr Still In Jail
We don’t know if Preston Lee Jr. is still in prison at this time.
We do not know who the Preston netizens are currently referring to.
Rumors and inquiries regarding Preston Lee Jr. and Ingrid Davis are the talk of the town.
However, it is still uncertain and unsubstantiated whether Ingrid and Preston are related.
Ingrid is revealed to be an incredibly accommodating person by her loved ones.
In fact, she was no doubt appreciated by many and loathed by not many.
Sadly, Ingrid of Colorado Springs passed away in August 2019.
The reason for Ingrid’s death remains a mystery even after more than two years.
Even her family has yet to speak about her sudden and untimely death.
Surprisingly, no media reported anything about her death.
Still, the people who admired her wanted to find out what happened to Ingrid.
The lady’s death story has been under the radar for so long.
We cannot imagine an investigation into her death continuing.
However, as of 2021, the case has reappeared on the web at the request of netizens to track down the reality.
Public netizens are posting numerous speculations and stories.
However, the reasonable reason remains a mystery up to this point.
Was it a suicide? We are actually not aware of this. Although Davis, as her friends said, was a brave girl.
Her friends wouldn’t believe it if a brave girl like Davis ended her life.
For now, we pray for her departed soul and call on the respected authority to investigate her death.
Also, Preston Lee Jr. and Ingrid Davis don’t appear to be related.
Fatal stabbing victim’s sons ‘all he used to talk about’
The name of the victim of Saturday’s deadly stabbing has been released by Des Moines police.
Preston Lee Davis, 35, of Des Moines was fatally stabbed early Saturday morning on the northwest side of Des Moines.
Shawn Eugene Davis, 49, was arrested in connection with the murder and charged with first-degree murder.
Victim and suspect are brothers. The stabbing happened during an argument at a family reunion, police said.
Preston leaves behind his wife and two children, and a circle of friends who struggle to understand his death.
Warnell Butts said he met Preston during his freshman year at North High School, where they played soccer together. Butts, who now lives in Carrollton, Georgia, said Preston has a big heart that most people don’t know about.
“Whenever I didn’t have a seat during the holidays, he always opened his door for me,” Butts said. “He was always putting something together so we could get together.”
Preston, who had two sons, is a good father, Butts said. “That’s all he ever talked about,” he said.
Butts said Preston was a car salesman with his own property and always lived in Des Moines. “He was a good man and didn’t deserve what he was given,” Butts said. “People don’t take it that well.”
Interactive map: Homicides in Des Moines over the last three years
Prior to this arrest, Shawn Eugene Davis was convicted of second-degree murder in the October 1986 shooting of 27-year-old Thomas Law.
The charges and sentence were reduced after the Iowa Court of Appeals ordered a new trial in 1989. Evidence had emerged supporting Shawn’s claim that he was attempting to escape from Law, who reached for a gun during the incident.
At the 1989 trial, Shawn pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in the death of Law and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.
Then, in 1996, Shawn was sentenced to 262 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. He was released in August 2015.
People v. Lee
630 p.2d 583 (1981)
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiffs-Appeals, v. David Scott LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 80SA314.
Colorado Supreme Court, En Banc.
June 15, 1981.
Denied replay on July 6, 1981.
*585 J.D. MacFarlane, Atty. General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen. Lynne Ford, Asst. atty Gen., Denver, for the Appellant.
J. Gregory Walta, Public Defender for the State of Colorado, Norman R. Mueller, Assistant Public Defender for the State, Denver, for the Defendant-Complainant.
QUINN, justice.
The defendant, David Scott Lee (defendant), is appealing his conviction, which was based on a general jury verdict of first-degree murder. His main contention is that the legal definition of extreme indifference murder, which was submitted to the jury for consideration in the general verdict, is constitutionally weak. We recently examined the constitutionality of murder by extreme indifference in People v. Marcy, Colorado, 628 P.2d 69 (1981) and based on that decision the defendant’s conviction must be vacated. Although Defendant makes several other claims in support of the reversal,[1] we only address two of them. We conclude that the trial court’s failure to suppress certain statements made by the defendant to a police officer and the prosecutor’s misconduct during the trial warrant a new trial. Accordingly, we cancel and set a pre-trial detention.
I. The District Court Proceedings
The then 15-year-old defendant[2] was charged with first-degree murder after counseling[3] and negligent homicide.[4] The charges stemmed from the October 2, 1978 shooting of William Larmore in the town of Colorado Springs. Larmore was hit by a bullet in the stomach while walking home from work. Prior to the trial, the defendant requested the suppression of several custody statements he had made and all derived evidence derived from them. The evidence at the suppression hearing established the following sequence of events relevant to this appeal.
On October 2, 1978, the Defendant of Officer Reeve was arrested by the Colorado Springs Police Department on an outstanding warrant on an unrelated matter.[5] After his arrest, the defendant was taken to the Colorado Springs Police Department for standard “booking” procedures. During this trial, Officer Reeve learned of the Larmore shooting and realized that he had arrested the defendant very close to the scene of the shooting. Reeve had previous contact with the defendant and considered him “streetwise”. *586 Reeve had no specific suspect and decided to question the defendant about the shooting. Around 6:30 p.m. m. On the evening of October 2, without any warning, he asked the defendant what he knew about the shooting. The defendant replied that he was familiar with it but did not wish to interfere. Reeve then told him that any truthful information he provided would benefit him in the matter for which he had been arrested. Upon further questioning, Defendant Reeve said that he was playing soccer with four other boys at Van Diest Park that afternoon and that one of the boys, “Bug”,[6] claimed responsibility for the shooting. The defendant described the location where the gun had been hidden. Reeve informed his supervisor of this information and unsuccessfully searched for the gun in accordance with instructions. Detective Gurule, who was also investigating the shooting, had previously spoken to a witness who saw a young black man with a similar description to the defendant carrying a gun case in the area of the shooting. Detective Gurule requested and obtained a photograph of the defendant from Reeve for the stated purpose of conducting a photo lineup with this witness.
Officer Reeve was ordered to re-interrogate the defendant, who had been transferred to a juvenile detention center, and obtain more detailed information about the shooting. The second interrogation was not preceded by a warning. The defendant named the people with whom he had played soccer that afternoon. He also stated that “Bug” gave him some .22 caliber bullets for disposal and he dumped them at a location near the park where they were playing ball. The defendant again expressed his reluctance to provide information, but Officer Reeve assured him that he would help him get released from his current detention.
After this interrogation, Officer Reeve returned to the police station. There he learned from Detective Gurule that a witness had photographically identified the defendant as the young black man seen in the area of the shooting earlier that afternoon. The following day, October 3, 1978, Officer Reeve drove to the park and found the discarded bullets mentioned by the defendant in his previous statement.
On the afternoon of October 3, Officer Reeve questioned the defendant a third time without informing him of any rights. The officer gave the defendant a high school yearbook to review to select the photo of “Bug.” The defendant was unable to provide photographic identification but insisted that “Bug” had shot the victim and the gun was hidden in the area previously described by the defendant during his initial questioning by Officer Reeve. At the suppression hearing, Officer Reeve testified that during all three interrogations, he considered the defendant a witness who may have had information about the shooting and therefore felt it unnecessary to inform him of his constitutional rights. For the same reason, the officer did not allow the accused’s parents to be present during the interrogations.[7] After the third interrogation, a police captain told Reeve that one of those previously named by the defendant had implicated the defendant in the shooting. Officer Reeve did not interrogate the defendant again thereafter.
Subsequent police investigations focused primarily on questioning individuals mentioned by the defendant in his statements to Officer Reeve. It was determined that the defendant and his friend Jimmy Sanchez broke into an apartment on October 2 and stole three firearms, including a shotgun. They fired the guns in a nearby field. Sanchez then went to his aunt Kathy Johnson’s home where the defendant had lived. The defendant meanwhile went somewhere to hide the guns. Shortly after their split, the defendant arrived at the Johnsons’ home with the guns. He told Sanchez and some other friends who were there that he had just shot someone. The defendant and his friends then drove to Van Diest Park to play football. On the way, the accused repeatedly admitted to the shots and once threw a handful of ammunition out of the car window. Police obtained a search warrant for Mrs Johnson’s home and seized the gun used in the shooting along with other guns and ammunition.
The court denied the defendant’s request for suppression and ruled that Miranda’s warnings were unnecessary because Officer Reeve was questioning the defendant as a witness and not a suspect. For similar reasons, the Court held that Section 19-2-102(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) was not applicable to the defendant’s hearing, prohibiting the admission of a child’s testimony, unless a parent of the child, or an attorney acting on the child’s behalf, was present at such questioning, and the child and parents, if present, were advised of the child’s constitutional rights.[8]
The case went to a jury trial and the defendant’s testimony to Officer Reeve was admitted in evidence, as were the bullets recovered from Reeve and the gun confiscated from Mrs. Johnson’s home. Prosecutors also called several individuals who the defendant had named in his testimony to Reeve as witnesses. During the direct examination of the victim’s wife, Donna Larmore, the prosecutor asked her, over the defendant’s objection, what happened to her after her husband was pronounced dead at the hospital. She replied, “Well, I was nauseous, and I went home and miscarried my child.” The court ordered the question and answer deleted, directed the jury not to consider that testimony, and denied the defendant’s motion for a trial.
It was the defendant’s theory that the victim was accidentally shot by a ricochet bullet fired from him in a field near the route Mr. Larmore was taking on his way home. The court presented the jury with alternative verdicts of first-degree murder by deliberation or by utter indifference. The minor offenses of second-degree murder,[9] involuntary manslaughter[10] and involuntary manslaughter[11] were also presented to the jury. The jury returned a general guilty verdict of first-degree murder, which resulted in a life sentence.
II. Extreme indifference murder
Since the defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder was by general judgment on orders for first-degree murder by deliberation and for first-degree murder by utter indifference, we cannot determine what form of first-degree murder the jury verdict represented. In these circumstances, constitutional weakness in either form of first-degree murder would require the defendant’s conviction to be overturned. In People v. Marcy, see above, we recently found that the statutory definition of murder of extreme indifference violates the equal protections of the laws of Article II, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution because this crime is not sufficiently distinguishable from second-degree murder, to justify this significant difference in punishment authorized by the legal system. Accord, People v. Gurule, Colo., 628 p.2d 99 (1981); people v Curtis, Colorado, 627 p.2d 734 (1981). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder should be overturned.
Overturning a conviction for an unconstitutional offense that is essentially indistinguishable from conduct prohibited by a less serious offense does not necessarily require a new trial. As we do in People v. Curtis, supra, have noted:
“On previous occasions when all elements of the lesser offense were established by competent evidence and included in the jury’s guilty verdict of the more serious but constitutionally weak felony, we have vacated the conviction and remanded in custody with orders to issue a conviction taken for the lesser offense and to annoy the accused People v . Webb, 189 Colo. 400, 542 p.2d 77 (1975); people v Bowers, 187 Colo. 233, 530 p.2d 1282 (1974).”
However, such an arrangement is not appropriate here, because other errors require a new attempt.
III. The Defendant’s Statements and Inferred Evidence
A
In rejecting the defendant’s request for suppression, the trial court did not attach any importance to the custodial aspect of the interrogations that took place in the two days following the defendant’s arrest, but instead ruled the request on the basis that the police did so in that period did not consider the defendant a suspect in the shooting. The verdict of the trial court provides an interpretation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966) which undermines its reasoning and nullifies the guarantees of Section 19-2-102(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
Briefly, the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. about 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 706-07, is that prosecutors may not use any testimony, whether exculpatory or incriminating, obtained from the investigation of the defendant unless it is established that the defendant reasonably exercised his privilege from self-incrimination and his right to legal counsel and thereafter voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. The reason for the warning requirement is that without such protection, the coercive pressure inherent in police custody “undermines the individual’s will to resist, forcing him to speak when he would not otherwise.” Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 719. This pressure can be practically overwhelming in a 15-year-old adolescent. Such a person, no matter how experienced, “is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the implications of … questions and answers” and “is incapable of knowing how to protect their own interests or benefits.” may derive his constitutional rights therefrom.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 US 49, 54, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 328 (1962). For this reason, section 19-2-102 requires (3)(c)(i) of the Colorado Children’s Code requires the presence of a parent, legal guardian, or attorney during the legal hearing and any subsequent questioning as an additional and necessary assurance that the juvenile’s self-incrimination privilege will be fully afforded. B. People v. Saiz , Colorado, 620 P.2d 15 (1980), People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235, 571 S.2d 305 (1977).
Under Miranda, therefore, the crucial stage for warnings is pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention means “interrogation by law enforcement officials after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his or her freedom of action”. Miranda *589 BC Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. about 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 706. It is undisputed here that the defendant was in police custody. See Orozco vs. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed. 2d 311 (1969). The people attempt to justify the failure to comply with Miranda and Section 19-2-102(3)(c)(I) by arguing that the defendant was not an actual suspect at the time of the interrogation and therefore was not interrogated within the intended period Sense by Miranda. We reject this argument as legally unsound.
The privilege against self-incrimination “extends not only to answers which in themselves would support a conviction … but also includes those which constitute a link in the chain of evidence …” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124 (1951); match, e.g. B. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L. ed. 2d 57 (1969); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed. 2d 653 (1964). An interrogation occurs when the police use words or take actions that are reasonably likely to provoke an incriminating reaction from the accused. Rhode Island vs. Innis, 446 US 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed. 2d 297 (1980); people v Lowe, Colorado, 616 p.2d 118 (1980). The decisive factor in this case is not whether the police regarded the accused as a suspect, but whether the accused was exposed to the risk of self-incrimination through police questioning while in police custody. See e.g. B. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Rogers vs United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951).
Prior to the initial interrogation, there was no clearly identifiable suspect, and Officer Reeve suspected the defendant might know something about the shooting. The first interrogation resulted in the defendant admitting knowledge of the shooting, including the gun location. Before the second interrogation, police had been told that the accused resembled the description of a young black man who was seen carrying a gun case in the area of the shooting. At the second interrogation, the defendant further implicated himself in the shooting by admitting to having disposed of bullets at Bug’s request. In fact, prior to the third interrogation, the defendant had been photographed as the young black man who was in the area of the shooting when it took place. During this final interrogation, the defendant reiterated his previous statements about his knowledge of the shooting and where the gun was found. Since the defendant was never advised of his absolute right to refuse to answer questions, the possibility of exercising this right was illusory while at the same time he was constantly at risk of actual incrimination.
Reduced to its basic elements, the People’s argument amounts to an attempt to impose a focus imperative on Miranda that would reduce the critical relationship between police custody and the prerogative of self-incrimination to constitutional insignificance. In Mathis v United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968), where the defendant was interrogated by federal officials while imprisoned on a state warrant, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s contention that the Miranda hearing was “for questioning only.” of someone being investigated in connection with the actual case being ‘in custody'”:
“Such a distinction has no substance, and it actually contradicts the entire purpose of the Miranda decision, which was intended to meaningfully protect Fifth Amendment rights. We find nothing in the Miranda statement calling for a reduction in the alerts people should be given to officers for questioning based on the reason the person is in custody. ID. at 4-5, 88 S. Ct. around 1505, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 385.
See e.g. B. Wade v. Mancusi, 358 F. Supp. 103 (W.D.N.Y.1973) (Miranda pre-interrogation warnings required if defendant is in custody for a crime other than the one under investigation); Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y.1972) (Miranda *590 cautions required if defendant is incarcerated and interrogation is related to prison disciplinary action that could potentially lead to criminal prosecution).[12] For the purposes of Miranda, there is no basis for giving greater constitutional importance to the level of police suspicion of a defendant already in custody than to the importance attached to the reason for his being in custody. Neither the lack of police suspicion nor the precise basis of arrest in any way affects the principle that “[under Miranda] a person in police custody … has an absolute right to refuse to answer any question …” United States v. Mandujano, 425 US 564, 581, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1778, 48 L.Ed. 2d 212, 225 (1976). We believe that Miranda’s prophylactic standards, as well as the safeguards of Section 19-2-102(3)(c)(I), should be applied to this defendant’s custody situation by giving him a full opportunity to exercise his privilege against himself. Accusations in a knowing and intelligent way.
The logic of the people’s argument would subject a person in police custody to an indefinite interrogation without any reference to basic constitutional rights, as long as the focus of suspicion had not yet shifted to the person being interrogated. We reject such an argument because it defeats the fundamental purpose of the Miranda decision and, in the case of juveniles, violates the statutory protections under Section 19-2-102(3)(c)(I). The trial court wrongly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his three statements made on October 2 and 3.[13]
B.
The defendant requested that not only his court testimony be suppressed, but also the results of those interrogations, including all genuine evidence directly derived therefrom and the statements of witnesses whose names were given by the defendant during the interrogations. Since the trial court found no violation against Miranda, it never considered applying the inferred evidence rule to these separate pieces of evidence.
Once it is determined that testimony was unlawfully obtained in violation of Miranda, not only must the testimony be suppressed, but evidence subsequently obtained as a result of the unlawful interrogation may also be suppressed. B. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1047 (1968); people v Founds, Colo., 621 p.2d 325 (1981); people v Saiz, see above; people v Lowe, see above. In situations involving successively invalid testimonies by a defendant or genuine evidence obtained from unlawful interrogation, the inferred evidence rule generally requires prosecutors to determine *591 that the evidence challenged was obtained from an independent source or that the link between the original illegality and the evidence is so weakened as to dispel the initial taint. B.People v. Founds, see above; people v Lowe, see above.
Additional considerations apply to this case in which the alleged fruit of Miranda’s violation is the testimony in court of witnesses whose identities were revealed in the course of an unlawful interrogation of the defendant. The source of trial testimony often lies in the witness’s free choice to testify in the case. “Witnesses are not like guns or documents that remain hidden until you turn over a sofa or open a filing cabinet. United States vs. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1060, 55 L.Ed. 2d 268, 277 (1978). It is not unreasonable to assume that, under normal circumstances, a witness’s decision to testify comes from an independent source unrelated to the official misconduct. Even where the path between the violation and the witness is direct, there may be sufficient mitigation to allow the witness to testify.[14] “The degree of free will required to dispel the taint will very likely be found more frequently in eyewitness testimony than in other types of evidence.” United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-77, 98 S.Ct. at 1060, 55 L.Ed. 2d at 277. As an alternative to proving an independent source or sufficient mitigation, prosecutors could possibly demonstrate as a basis for admission that the witnesses and their testimonies would inevitably have been discovered in the normal course of the police investigation. B. United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913, 90 S. Ct. 2215, 26 L.Ed. 2d 570 (1970); wayne v United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.Cir.1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860, 84 S. Ct. 125, 11 L.Ed. 2d 86 (1963).
The investigating court should apply these principles to the evidence under appeal and make appropriate determinations of admissibility in accordance with the rule for inferred evidence.
IV. Misconduct of the Public Prosecutor’s Office
The frailty of the trial was compounded when the prosecutor produced prejudicial and wholly irrelevant evidence of the victim’s wife, Mrs. Larmore, miscarrying after the death of her husband. The trial court’s cautionary instruction to the jury in these circumstances is insufficient to offset the inflammatory nature of this testimony and its likely impact on the jury deliberations. There are some cases “when the risk of the jury failing or being unable to follow directions is so great, and the consequences of failure are so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. ” Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 485 (1968). In such a case, the defendant’s motion for mistrial should have been granted.
Records show that on the day of the shooting, defense counsel unsuccessfully objected to the prosecution’s attempt to establish Mrs Larmore’s general physical condition. After extracting evidence from her that she was four months pregnant that day, the prosecutor questioned her about the defendant’s objection to knowing of her husband’s death and concluded his face-to-face interrogation with testimony of her miscarriage . In connection with this record, it is credulity loaded to regard the production of this testimony as the result of carelessness or error. Given the apparent irrelevance of the charges and the tremendous potential for prejudice, we view the presentation of this testimony as a thinly veiled attempt to elicit the jury’s sympathy for the witness because of her loss of husband and child. Whether the prosecutor’s testimony was also an attempt to instill resentment in the jury against the defendant we cannot determine. Whatever the prosecutor’s other motives, the natural and probable consequence of such testimony was to present the defendant to the jury as the person who not only shot the victim but also caused the death of his unborn child, a matter for which he was responsible was not charged.[15]
Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have been confronted with a file constituting misconduct by the prosecutor’s office of the District Attorney’s Office for the Fourth Circuit. In People v. Ferrell, Colorado, 613 P.2d 324 (1980), during a murder trial, the same prosecutor pleaded with the jury to retaliate against the accused by finding him guilty. We found that his statements “exceeded the bounds of reasonable argument and therefore cannot be condoned”. Colo., 613 P.2d at 326. In People v. Estep, 196 Colo. 340, 583 P.2d 927 (1978), we expressed our strong disapproval of the district attorney’s cross-examination of a defense witness in a manner that manifested the prosecutor’s personal belief in the guilt of the accused. What we see in People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 411, 509 P.2d 801, 804 (1973) is particularly relevant to the behavior of the prosecutor in this case:
“It is clear from the records of this case that the district attorney was fully aware that the prosecution witness would react in the manner he did and thus present the jury with improper and highly prejudicial evidence. His conduct in this regard is not This court has repeatedly ruled that a prosecutor’s duty is not only to convict, but also to ensure that justice is served by seeking the truth through the presentation of adequate evidence clear disregard for the elementary principles of fairness and legality can only be condemned.”
A repeated pattern of overzealous law enforcement tactics will not be tolerated. The trial court must not hesitate to impose effective and severe sanctions, if necessary, should there be a repetition of the kind of misguided zeal that undermined the fairness of the first trial. See People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 508 p.2d 379 (1979); people v Walker, 180 colo. 184, 504 p.2d 1098 (1973); I ABA Standards For Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.6 (2nd ed. 1980).
The verdict is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with the views expressed herein on deliberative murder[16] and all *593 minor offenses that could reasonably be presented to the jury for retrial.
REMARKS
[1] Among the defendant’s demands that we believe unnecessary include: (1) the alleged denial of his right to a unanimous verdict on the general sentencing forms of guilty and not guilty of first-degree murder without specifying the specific nature of the murder committed murder d. B. Murder by deliberation or murder by utter indifference; (2) the trial court denying his motion to have his testimony suppressed on the grounds that it was involuntary; and (3) the finding of the trial court that it had no jurisdiction under Section 19-1-104(4)(c), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) to try the defendant as a juvenile or to remit the case the juvenile court available. [2] Der Angeklagte wurde gemäß Abschnitt 19-1-104(4)(b)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), der vorsieht, dass ein Kind wegen der Provision angeklagt werden kann, als Erwachsener angeklagt eines Verbrechens, wenn er beschuldigt wird, ein Gewaltverbrechen begangen zu haben, das in Abschnitt 18-1-105 als Verbrechen der Klasse 1 definiert ist, und er vierzehn Jahre oder älter ist. [3] Abschnitt 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). [4] Abschnitt 18-3-102(1)(d), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). [5] Officer Reeve kontaktierte den Angeklagten am 29. September 1978 in Bezug auf eine jugendliche Vorladung wegen eines Vorfalls, der sich an der Mitchell High School ereignete. Der Angeklagte war kein Schüler dieser Schule. Als Reeve zur Polizeistation zurückkehrte, stellte er fest, dass ein Haftbefehl gegen den Angeklagten ausstand. Die Aufzeichnung offenbart nicht die Grundlage für den Haftbefehl. [6] Die Polizei stellte später fest, dass der Angeklagte unter dem Spitznamen „Bug“ bekannt war. [7] Nachdem er den Angeklagten am 2. Oktober 1978 in Gewahrsam genommen hatte, unternahm Officer Reeve mehrere erfolglose Versuche, den Vater des Angeklagten zu kontaktieren. Schließlich fand Reeve am 3. Oktober den Vater und teilte ihm mit, dass der Angeklagte in der Jugendstrafanstalt sei, Informationen über die Schießerei geliefert habe und einen Anwalt brauche, falls er verdächtigt werde. [8] Abschnitt 19-2-102(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) sieht vor:„Keine Aussagen oder Geständnisse eines Kindes, die als Ergebnis einer Vernehmung des Kindes durch einen Strafverfolgungsbeamten zu Handlungen gemacht wurden, die mutmaßlich von dem Kind begangen wurden und die ein Verbrechen darstellen würden, wenn sie von einem Erwachsenen begangen würden, sind als Beweismittel gegen dieses Kind zulässig es sei denn, ein Elternteil, Vormund oder gesetzlicher Vormund des Kindes war bei einer solchen Vernehmung anwesend und das Kind und sein Elternteil, Vormund oder gesetzlicher Vormund wurden auf das Schweigerecht des Kindes hingewiesen, dass alle gemachten Aussagen gegen es verwendet werden können in a Gericht, das Recht auf Anwesenheit eines Anwalts während einer solchen Vernehmung und das Recht, einen Rechtsbeistand zu bestellen, wenn dies zum Zeitpunkt der Vernehmung beantragt wird; außer wenn ein öffentlicher Verteidiger oder Rechtsbeistand, der das Kind vertritt, bei einer solchen Vernehmung anwesend ist , können solche Aussagen oder Eingeständnisse als Beweismittel zulässig sein, selbst wenn die Eltern, der Vormund oder der gesetzliche Vormund des Kindes nicht anwesend waren.
[9] Abschnitt 18-3-103(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). [10] Abschnitt 18-3-104(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). [11] Abschnitt 18-3-105(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). [12] Zur Unterstützung des Arguments, dass Miranda auf Angeklagte in Haft gehalten werden sollte, die im Mittelpunkt des polizeilichen Verdachts für das untersuchte Verbrechen stehen, zitiert The People People v. Gladney, 194 Colo. 68, 570 S.2d 231 (1977) ; People v. Downer, 192 Col. 264, 557 S.2d 835 (1976); und People v. Thornton, 190 Colo. 397, 547 S.2d 1278 (1976). In jedem dieser Fälle fand das Verhör jedoch statt, bevor der Angeklagte festgenommen wurde, und der Angeklagte befand sich einfach nicht in der von Miranda erwogenen Haftsituation. Siehe Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977); Beckwith gegen Vereinigte Staaten, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976). [13] Wir gehen nicht auf die Behauptung des Angeklagten ein, seine Äußerungen hätten als unfreiwillig unterdrückt werden sollen. The trial court concluded that the Miranda warnings were not applicable to the successive interrogations on October 2 and 3, and, therefore, it never reached the question of what effect the failure to warn had on the issue of voluntariness. “[The fact] that a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made.” Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740, 86 S. Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L. Ed. 2d 895, 898 (1966). Since the trial court must conduct a new hearing on the derivative evidence issue, see Part III B, infra, it can determine at that same hearing whether, in spite of the failure to warn and the alleged promises of assistance by Officer Reeve, the defendant’s statements were voluntary in the constitutional sensethat is, the product of a rational intellect and a free will. E.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). Only if the defendant’s statements satisfy appropriate legal standards of voluntariness may they be used for impeachment purposes at trial. E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971). [14] In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 435, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2359, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182, 187 (1974), the Supreme Court addressed the question “whether the testimony of a witness in respondent’s state court trial for rape must be excluded simply because police had learned the identity of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when he was in custody as a suspect, but had not yet been advised that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indigent.” The interrogation took place prior to the court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), but the trial occurred after Miranda and that decision was applicable to the trial. After noting that the interrogating officers were “focusing on the suspect’s opportunity to have retained counsel with him during the interrogation if he chose to do so,” as established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964), the Court held that the testimony of the witness should not have been excluded:“The statements actually made by respondent to the police, as we have observed, were excluded at trial in accordance with Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, [86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882] (1966). Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements may have had, we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the witness Henderson as well.” 417 U.S. at 447-48, 84 S. Ct. at 2365, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 195.
The principal factors on which the Court seemed to rely were the apparent good faith of the officers in conducting the interrogation, the voluntary character of the statement, and the tenuous relationship between the high cost of excluding the trial testimony of the witness and the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule.
[15] On October 2, 1978, prior to the shooting, Mrs. Larmore had been sick and telephoned her husband at his job, asking him to come home and take her to the hospital. The shooting occurred while the husband was returning home in response to this phone call. [16] The jury’s general verdict of guilty to first degree murder did not constitute an implied acquittal of murder after deliberation. Both murder after deliberation and extreme indifference murder were submitted to the jury as alternatives. Under the statutory scheme first degree murder by extreme indifference carries the same penalty as murder after deliberation and neither crime is a lesser included offense of the other. People v. Curtis, Colo., 627 P.2d 734 (1981); see also People v. Gurule, Colo., 628 P.2d 99 (1981). Therefore, there is no impediment to the retrial of the defendant for murder after deliberation.Related searches to What Happened To Ingrid Davis From Colorado Springs Murder and Preston Lee Jr Homicide
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